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Abstract
During routine inspections of the Space Shuttle's Main Propulsion System (MPS) Liquid Oxygen (LO2)
pre-valve, the mechanism provided to maintain the valve in the open position was found cracked. The
mechanism is a Vespel roller held against the valve visor by a stack of Belleville springs. The roller has
been found cracked 3 times. All three instances were in the same valve in the same location. There are
6 pre-valves on each orbiter, and only one has exhibited this problem. Every-flight inspections were
instituted and the rollers were found to be cracked after only one flight. Engineers at Marshall Space
Flight Center, Johnson Space Center and Kennedy Space Center worked together to determine a
solution. There were several possible contributors to the failure: a mis-aligned visor, an out of
specification edge with a sharp radius, an out of specification tolerance stack up of a Belleville spring
stack that caused un-predicted loads on the Vespel SP-21 roller, and a dimple machined into the side of
the roller to indicate LO2 compatibility that created a stress riser. The detent assembly was removed and
replaced with parts that were on the low-side of the tolerance stack up to eliminate the potential for high
loads on the detent roller. After one flight, the roller was inspected and showed fewer signs of wear and
no cracks.
Introduction
NASA's Space Shuttle is propelled into orbit by 2 solid rocket boosters (SRBs) and 3 Space Shuttle Main
Engines (SSMEs). The SSMEs are liquid rocket engines that use liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen as
propellant. The propellant is stored in the non-reusable external tank. During loading the propellants flow
through the orbiter by way of the fill and drain system on the main propulsion system (MPS). The
propellants are loaded in this manner in order to cool down the various MPS fluid components and to chill
the engines. This prevents gas ingestion by the engines during ignition.
The MPS contains various sub-systems including the feed system. The feed system allows flow of
oxidizer and propellant from the external tank to the 3 SSME's. After the feed system manifold there are
3 pre-valves which are used for isolation of the propellant supply from the SSME's. These pre-valves are
used to prevent catastrophic failures of the oxidizer turbo pump during nominal engine shutdown as well
as during a contingency situation when engine isolation is necessary. Because of these important tasks,
the pre-valves are nspected and tested routinely.
Valve Function
Each Space Shuttle Main Engine has two 12 inch diameter propellant isolation valves. One valve is in the
liquid hydrogen system and the Other in the liquid oxygen (LO2) system. They are referred to as pre-
valves and are located in the Main Propulsion System. The pre-valves are used during all phases of the
shuttle operation: fill and drain of the external tank, ascent, and in contingency situations. The primary
purpose of the prevalves is to stop the flow of propellant to the SSME's in the case of an engine failure or
shutdown. The restriction of flow reduces the likelihood of an uncontained fire in the aft compartment or
"All employees of NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, ER33 Valve Ducts and Actuators Design and
Development Branch
aEmployee of Jacobs, Marshall Space Flight Center, ER33 Valve Ducts and Actuators Design and Development
Branch
Proceedings of the 39 thAerospace Mechanisms Symposium, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center, May 7-9, 2008
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080031529 2019-08-30T04:55:24+00:00Z
engine. The LO2 pre-valves also serve a critical purpose during Main Engine Cut Off (MECO). During
MECO, helium is injected from the SSME pogo accumulator into the area upstream of the high pressure
oxidizer turbo pump (HPOT). This maintains the proper pressure for shutdown of the HPOT and allows
for safe engine shutdown. The prevalves close, providing the sealing force to maintain the pressure and
limit the volume that must be pressurized. The valves also allow the recirculation pumps to operate to
chill the engines prior to launch. In order to prevent overpressure of the feedlines, the valve contains a
reverse flow relief valve and a visor liftoff mechanism.
The pre-valves are pneumatically actuated, bi-stable, two-position valves. The valve has a half moon
shaped inconel visor that seals against a KeI-F seat in the closed position. A photo of the valve between
the open and closed positions is shown in Figure 1. To open the valve helium is supplied to an actuator
that rotates the visor out of the propellant flow path. When the valve opens, two Belleville spring loaded
mechanisms hold a small roller in detent grooves on each side of the visor to ensure the visor remains in
the fully open position. These detent mechanisms serve as a mechanical latch to hold the valve in the
open position to prevent an unwanted closure of the valve during engine operation. Because the valve is
bi-stable, the detent mechanisms add redundancy to the valve. Helium is again supplied to the opposite
side of the valve actuator piston to close the valve.
Figure 1: Space Shuttle MPS Pre-Valve
Pre-valve Detent Mechanism Description
The detent mechanisms are composed of several piece parts as shown in the cross sectional and
exploded views in Figures 2 and 3. The assembly contains a roller, pin, and follower that allow the
mechanism to translate across the visor. The assembly also contains a stack of Belleville springs and
spacers. The springs allow for vertical movement of the roller. The spacers protect the springs from
rubbing on one another and allow the springs to invert.
The detent roller is manufactured from LO2/LH2 compatible Vespel SP-21. As the valve opens, the part of
the visor known as the ramp comes into contact with the roller compressing the Belleville spring stack in
the detent mechanism. The roller travels along the ramp to the detent groove, shown in Figure 4. Figure
5 shows the valve in the open position with the roller locked in the detent groove. Rotation of the visor
itself is controlled by mechanical stops in the actuator that do not allow the visor to rotate more than 90
degrees. The stop also prevents the roller from rolling through the groove and out the other side. As the
roller moves up the ramp, the follower also moves up. This upward motion compresses the Belleville
spring stack. As the stack is compressed, the spacers slide within the detent cap guiding the entire
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stack's motion. They also keep the four Bellevilles from contacting each other as each is compressed so
that they can move beyond the point where they invert. The top spacer contacts a lip on the cap and
transmits the force of stack deflection through the cap and into the seven bolts holding the mechanism
within the valve body. The cap retains a static spring energized seal in the valve body that prevents
propellant leakage into the aft compartment of the Orbiter. When the valve is commanded closed, the
actuation force generated overcomes the force generated by the roller in the groove and compresses the
spring stack until the roller is forced out of the detent groove. The roller then rolls down the visor ramp
until the two parts are no longer in contact with each other. In the closed position, the detent Belleville's
are only compressed to their installation height and the roller and follower hang inside the valve. The
follower has a large land that contacts the retainer to hold it in place. The retainer serves multiple
purposes: it prevents the follower and spring stack from falling into the valve and ensures the spring stack
is compressed to the installation height before coming into contact with the visor, the retainer is keyed
within the cap to prevent the mechanism from being installed in a manner where the roller and detent
groove would not line up, and the retainer prevents the follower from pivoting or rotating as the roller
moves up the visor ramp.
Figure 2 Cross-section of the detent mechanism
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Figure 3 Exploded view of the different detent rnechanism's piece parts
Figure 4 Prevalve Visor
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Figure 5 Roller locked in the detent grove when the valve is in the open position
Detent Mechanism Inspections
During an inspection of OV-104 (Atlantis) after the vehicle's second flight, one of the detent rollers in the
engine 3 LO2 prevalve was found to have a crack through the full thickness and down one third the length
of the part. The root cause of the crack was not found and the crack was dismissed as a one-time
occurrence. However, as part of the forward plan, the requirement to inspect each roller during every
vehicle's Orbiter Maintenance Down Period (OMDP) was instituted. During every OMDP, all six LO2 and
LH2 detent mechanisms are removed from the prevalves and inspected for wear or damage. Each roller
typically shows a washboard pattern around its circumference that is considered nominal wear. This
pattern is due to the large visor swinging and contacting the motionless roller. Because the surface of the
visor is relatively rough and the visor moves at a fast rate, it is suspected that the roller does not roll
smoothly across the visor. The slipping of the roller may contribute to the "wash board" wear marks that
are typically seen around the roller.
As the Belleville spring is compressed, the roller is forced against the retainer which results in wear on the
roller. Also, there are typically black indications on the retainer where this contact takes place. The black
marks indicate deposits of Vespel material were transferred from the roller surface to the retainer.
Some rollers within the fleet are specially machine to have a smaller diameter in specific locations. The
purpose of this process is to reduce the effect of rough or high spots on that specific valve's visor. During
inspections after the initial flights Of the OV-103 and OV-104, several rollers in the LH2 and LO2 systems
were found with rough gouges at specific distances along their lengths. Borescope and visual inspections
concluded these instances of damage were due to wear associated with the high spots on each visor.
Two rollers showing this type of damage are shown in Figure 6. Examples of specially machined rollers
with gaps to avoid a high spot on a discrepant visor are shown in Figure 7.
Figure 6 Rollers Exhibiting Wear due to High or Rough Spots on the Visor
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Figure 7 Drawings showing how these rollers are machined to avoid discrepant areas on valve
visors
In addition to roller wear, the retainers also show signs of wear due to contact from the side of the
follower. Deposits of the retainer material have been found on the pin and follower which further supports
the theory that the retainer is being damaged by these components. The cap also shows s=gns of wear
due to the sliding contact of the four spring spacers. Example of nominal wear associated with spacer
travel in the cap can be seen in Figure 8. All parts of the assembly are inspected thoroughly and
replaced if the wear is considered significant. Minor wear to metal parts may be treated with Chem-film
which is an acceptable practice for Shuttle LO2 and LH2 systems.
Wear due to cap/spacer rubbing
Figure 8 Cap showing signs of nominal wear due to spacer rubbing
Cracked Roller Anomaly
To date, three cracked rollers have been found through inspection. AIi3 rollers were in the OV-104
Engine 3 LO2 pre-valve. The first cracked roller was found after the second flight of OV-104, which lead
to the inspections discussed above. During OMDP for OV-104 after flight 26, the second cracked roller
was discovered. Following this investigation, every flight inspections were instituted for the specific
Engine 3 LO2 pre-valve. During these inspections the third cracked roller was discovered. Unlike the
prior 2 cracked rollers, this roller cracked after only 1 flight. This raised concerns that a cracked roller that
remains in service, may degrade further and cause a serious failure in the LO2 system.
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A cracked roller may liberate debris. This debris should be captured by the pre-valve screen which is a
1000 micron screen downstream of the pre-valve to prevent contamination from entering the engine.
Another failure mode is that if the roller completely fails and the metal follower comes n contact with the
pre-valve visor, an ignition source would be created in the highly volatile LO2 environment.
After the second failure was discovered, two likely causes were identified: roller material LO2 compatibility
testing marks and detent groove leading edge sharpness Before a soft good or non-metallic materia is
used in Space Shuttle LO2 systems, each batch of the material must be compatibility tested. The Vespel
SP21 used for the roller requires this testing. To insure that rollers which aren't batch tested are not
installed in the vehicle, a small dimple is machined into the end of the roller to indicate that the material
successfully completed the required testing. The depth and diameter of the dimple are drawing
controlled. The mark is to be no more than 0.030 inch deep and 0.062 inch in diameter. It was noted that
the crack observed on the second and third cracked rollers initiated at the dimple and propagated through
the thickness of the roller. The dimple was identified as a stress riser and a contributor to the cracked
rollers. However, it was also noted that thefirst cracked roller did not have a dimple, so there is likely an
additional cause.
Testing was performed to verify that a roller with a dimple has reduced fracture toughness. However,
during this testing, the loads required to crack a roller were less than the estimated loads imparted by the
Belleville spring stack in a nominal assembly. This information prompted further investigation after the
third roller was found cracked. The original intent of the testing was only to prove that the dimple did
affect the fracture toughness of the roller. The testing was performed at ambient conditions. The load
required to crack a dimple-less roller was twice that of the load required to crack a roller with a dimple.
Molds of the visor detent groove were made so that measurements of the key dimensions of the visor
could be taken. It was determined that the radius of the lip of the leading edge of the detent groove was
sharper for this particular valve visor than drawings for the part allowed. The edge radius underwent a
grinding and polishing process with the valve installed on the vehicle. Prior to machining, the radius was
found to vary between 0.005 to 0.020 inches at various points along the length of the detent groove. The
drawing requirement for this radius was 0.015 to 0.030 inches. After the procedure, the sharpest
dimension found along the length of the detent leading edge was 0.019 inch. The polishing process was
performed between the second and third rollers.
It was also noted from the mold impressions that the one end (labeled as "5" in Figure 9) of the leading
edge was slightly higher than the other. This resulted in an unparallelism between the roller and visor
interface. This unparallelism resulted n one side of the leading edge being approximately 0.025 inches
higher than the other. This meant that one end, the horseshoe shaped end compressed the detent roller
more than the open end. All three cracks initiated on the end corresponding to the higher compression.
Figure 9: Pre-valve Visor Detent Groove
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Rationale to fly after finding the second cracked roller was based primarily on the conclusion that the
sharp leading edge of the detent groove was the root cause of the cracking. However, after the detent
groove leading edge was returned to print, the third roller cracked after only one flight. The second and
third cracked rollers can be seen in Figure 10. In each case, the crack was observed to run through the
LO2 compatibility testing mark and completely through the thickness of the roller. This can be seen in
Figure 11.
Figure 10 The second and third cracked rollers
Figure 11 Crack can be seen through the compatibility testing mark and from the inner to outer
diameters
During further examination of all available data it was noted that the visor to valve body height, recorded
during the visor mold impression and grinding work, was out of family. This information kicked off a
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tolerance stack up analysis. The third cracked roller kicked-off an effort for a more in-depth investigation
of alternate causes. Because the first two causes that were examined, the dimple and the sharp edge,
did not preclude another cracked roller, it was necessary to look for a less obvious cause. Because the
third failure was after only one flight, resources and attention not previously available were given to the
problem.
The out of specification measurement of the visor height prompted the tolerance stack-up investigation.
The measured distance of the visor from the valve body was used as a basis for a tolerance stack-up
analysis. Actual measurements of the installed detent mechanism components were used, including a
force-deflection curve of the Belleville spring stack set-up. The stack up of the individual components
was subtracted from the visor height to determine if interference was possible. Interference would result
in the spring stack reaching its solid height and imparting unexpected high loads on the roller. It was
determined that combinations of nominal piece parts tolerances could result in deflections that caused the
Belleville spring stack to go flat and introduce the high loads onto the roller. An illustration of the
mechanism and the measurements used in the analysis are shown in Figure 12. As a solution, piece
parts were carefully selected to produce an acceptable assembly on the low side of the tolerance band.
This should preclude the spring stack from reaching a solid deflection height. Further mitigation was to
machine an angle in the retainer surface that contacts the follower. The surface was angled to 2 degrees
based on the marks left by the roller on the retainer. These marks indicated the angle at which the roller
was moving when in contact with the visor. The modified retainer allows additional movement of the
follower and prevents binding at the follower-retainer interface. This reduction in binding also reduces the
load being applied to roller.
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Figure 12 Detent Mechanism Tolerance Stackup
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